Education and Empire, Old and New

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Breaking Down the Ivory Tower: The University in the Creation of Another World

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It is still very fortunately the case...that the American university remains the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices.
—Edward Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*

In his final completed book, Edward Said expresses gratitude for the persistence of the American university and its “devotion to reflection, research, [and] Socratic teaching,” especially in this period in which “we are bombarded by prepackaged and reified representations of the world that usurp consciousness and preempt democratic critique” (*Humanism* 71). Although he recognizes that “there is now an assault on thought itself” (*Humanism* 71), Said identifies the university as a site of refuge from the uncritical, reduced patterns of thought that dominate public discourse. He did not, however, anticipate the inroads the neoconservative Right he calls “my antagonists” would achieve against the academy (*Humanism* 132). Less than one month after Said’s death, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3077, the International Studies in Higher Education Act, which marked not only a clear victory in the Right’s quest to contain public discourse, but also a direct assault on Said’s work and legacy. H.R. 3077 sought to amend Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965, which provides federal funding for programs of international education and university-based area studies centers across the nation. The amendment provided government oversight of the funds allocated to such centers and programs, based not on peer review by other scholars, but on the recommendations of an International Advisory Board composed in part of non-academics invested in national security. This Act aimed to shift the focus of grant selection from knowledge production and teaching—the purposes of universities and higher education—to the advancement of national interests, defined in terms of “Homeland Security and effective U.S. engagement abroad” (H.R. 3077).

H.R. 3077 constitutes part of a right-wing political agenda to impose a restrictive frame for understanding the world and America’s place in it by foreclosing all critique of the U.S. state—whether in the media, on the street, or in the academy—especially its violent actions at home and abroad following September 11th. The tragedy of 9/11 provided the opportunity for the Right to launch this assault on the academy. Martin Kramer and other neoconservative advocates have exploited 9/11’s reactionary hyper-nationalism and anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism against the scholars and paradigms they cannot tolerate—namely, Edward Said and postcolonial theory. In their view area studies, particularly Middle Eastern studies, has been infected by Said and pernicious postcolonial theory, which actively question the operations of (American) empire, including the deployment of scholarship for its purposes. Instead, these neoconservative advocates seek to put knowledge of the world’s Others into the service of U.S. global power.

But as Vijay Prashad, director of International Studies at Trinity College, asserts, “H.R. 3077 is not a break from U.S. government policy” (“Confronting”), but an attempt to return area studies to its Cold War origins when it was part of the struggle for world hegemony against Communist states. It also marks a reaction against the field’s decolonization that resulted from the student struggles of the 1960s that pushed the academy to reflect critically on its relation
to the state. This paper will first locate H.R. 3077 in these struggles to decolonize area studies from its Cold War origins and connection to the national security state. It will then examine the roots of this act by focusing on neoconservative discourses that have attacked decolonized area studies, particularly Martin Kramer’s critiques of Said and postcolonial theory. It will conclude with a discussion of the political drive for H.R. 3077 and other acts that have followed it, as well as the effects they could render on public discourse and academic freedom. Recognizing that H.R. 3077 and its offspring constitute an attack on freedom and on the very conditions for democracy, this paper will examine the contexts in which they are situated, as well as the multiple, urgent issues at stake, issues to which scholars must respond.

The Decolonization of Area Studies

The present battle over area studies grows out of the decolonization of the field that occurred in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The academics and students that led this movement to disaggregate area studies from the state demonstrated that the field grew out of World War II and the Cold War. In achieving their goal, these scholars, such as Bruce Cumings and Immanuel Wallerstein, pioneered a rejuvenated, more critical area studies that is now under attack by the new Right.

Area studies developed out of the recruitment of intellectual labor into the direct service of the U.S. state, which began during World War II as part of the fight against fascism. In 1941 the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies assisted the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in recruiting the nation’s foremost scholars to “collect and analyze all information and data which may bear on national security” (quoted in Cumings). Recruited academics offered their services through the OSS Research and Analysis branch, which “presented a model for postwar collaboration between intelligence and academe” and provided the context for the emergence and development of area studies following WWII, when the field’s organization shifted from the state to the university (Cumings). Founding organizers of “foreign area studies” who worked for the state sought to establish a formal separation between the government and its fostering of the field so that it did not appear to be an appendage of intelligence, emphasizing the “impartial and objective” nature of the work that was “clear of conflicts of interests” (Cumings). However, despite such declarations of objectivity, the intelligence functions of that research was of fundamental importance to the field’s first proponents. The claim of an official, public separation between the government and the university shrouded the original area studies centers’ intimate ties with the state, particularly the FBI, the CIA (the foundations that funded research sometimes laundered CIA money), and the military (Cumings).

Advocates of subordinating area studies knowledge to national needs included scholars themselves, represented by leading academic associations. In 1947 the SSRC framed its arguments for area studies with the geopolitical concerns of the state, stating in its closing remarks:

[W]e must work toward complete world coverage. This is necessary for several reasons. In terms of the national good, we must not gamble. ... Since we cannot at once develop first class centers of study for every area, it would seem practical to attack
the critical ones first. ... The long-run aim should be that once the more important areas are taken care of, or at the same time where opportunity is favorable, we should move rapidly toward filling out the map. (Quoted in Wallerstein 203-204).

Knowledge production itself as a social good does not provide adequate incentive for learning about the non-Western world; nor do the promotion of mutual understanding and bases for cross-cultural communication. Instead, the SSRC frames the need for area studies in terms of power and the ability to contain “our next great crisis,” which could happen anywhere—hence, the need for “complete world coverage.” It uses martial language—the need to “attack” areas—portraying knowledge itself as a weapon against a dangerous form of ignorance. In determining which areas must be “attacked” first, “the relative power of an area is one important consideration. Does the area in question generate an excess of power; does it approximate an equilibrium in this regard; or does it simply submit to the power exerted from other areas?” (quoted in Wallerstein 203). The SSRC claims the maintenance of peace as one of area studies’ objectives; yet, the peace it strives to maintain is defined not by mutual coexistence, but by the exercise of control, particularly over regions that “generate an excess of power.”

This view of area studies’ value to the state was not shared by all people invested in the field, however. In 1952 UNESCO devoted an issue of its International Social Science Bulletin to area studies, which included early critiques of the field by numerous scholars. For example Jean Duroselle states:

It can, indeed, be said that a study of an area which treated its subject in the absolute and failed to regard it as essentially an element in the human universe, would be pure verbiage, without any scientific value.... It is finally possible to imagine—and it would not be such a very extravagant flight of fancy—areal studies being commissioned by the Defence Ministry or Foreign Affairs Ministry of this or that country, with a militarist or imperialist aim. (Quoted in Wallerstein 208)

Duroselle and other critics cast serious doubt on the quality of scholarship of a field based on a will to knowledge and power. Moreover, Duroselle signals the impossible fantasy of maintaining an objective perspective in area studies, which he correctly predicts can become a tool of an imperialist foreign policy. This relation between the state and knowledge, however, does not constitute a new trend discovered during the Cold War but has its roots in the British Empire’s relentless attempt to control knowledge in what Thomas Richards has called the “imperial archive.”

The imperial archive, a nexus of power and knowledge, does not exist in reality, but is a myth. “[It] was a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of empire,” Richards argues, binding together its “vast and various parts” (6). Though the imperial archive is based on assertions of fact and objectivity, the archival gaze manipulates information as it is gathered: “Unawares, the archival gaze has combined the triple register of inquiry, measure and examination to prepare data to be acted upon by the variable...
modalities of power. ... Raw data, then, means raw materials” (Richards 116-117). The “raw” data collected in this context must be transformed into knowledge benefiting imperial power, just as raw materials seized in peripheral territories ultimately profit the metropole. The fact that the quest for dominance has predetermined the quest for knowledge precludes the possibility of objectively observing and collecting facts. The claim to objectivity, whether in imperial Britain or (neo)imperial America, constitutes an unacknowledged fantasy, if not a deliberate façade, that obscures the operations of power lying beneath it.

The imperial archive anticipates the American manifestation of imperial power. “Seen from the perspective of our own information society,” Richards asserts, “the Victorian archive appears as a prototype for a global system of domination through circulation, an apparatus for controlling territory by producing, distributing, and consuming information about it” (17). The operations of empire, including the work of the archive, have become more dispersed and diffuse, shifting from their modern form of direct control and armed occupation to their postmodern form of decentered, disembodied occupation through “the mediated instrumentality of information” (Richards 23). At the close of the nineteenth century, this increasing mobility and flexibility of information created the apparent problem of losing control over knowledge, which in turn generated the concept of the enemy archive, “a parallel but alien construction of comprehensive knowledge that had to be interrogated at all costs” (Richards 113). In the British context, the end of the Franco-Prussian War instigated a prompt response to match Prussian knowledge production—a response congruent with Cold War strategy, in which “keeping the peace meant maintaining a balance of power that was also a balance of information” (Richards 112). This external threat incited attempts to consolidate a control over knowledge perceived to be in danger of slipping away; yet, the monopolization of knowledge was always only a fantasy, and the imaginary construction of the enemy archive provided a means of refusing recognition of this impossibility. During the Cold War, the U.S., like its British forerunner, imagined its own enemy archive in the threat of communism and the Soviet Union and sought to contain this menace partly by attempting to seize and maintain control over knowledge of the world. Richards aptly signals a correlation between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the 1957 launch of Sputnik, as both impelled immediate, reactionary drives to increase knowledge production among the dominant global powers of their respective eras. The Sputnik launch instigated a massive funding campaign for higher education in the U.S., as the government passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, which introduced Title VI federal funds for foreign area studies. As the legislation’s title implies, the purpose of the NDEA was directly tied to concerns of national security, and a report by a representative of the Department of Education clearly states: “In passing NDEA, Congress recognized that the defense and security of the nation were inseparably bound with education” (Scarfo).

Furthermore, the threatening specter of the enemy archive impels the development of “both new technologies of knowledge and new variants on the will to state power” (Richards 113). For example Richards describes state nomadology, “a form of objectless surveillance,” as one such technique:
It relies not on a unified theory of power but on a diversity of fields of applied knowledge. Nevertheless it presupposes a teleology of information and relies on certain mechanisms for insuring that the power embodied in knowledge resides finally, and securely, with the state. State nomads do not necessarily work for the state or even reside in it, but they are adept at working out complex lines of alliance and affiliation for transferring intelligence to the state. (135)

In the postmodern age, the apparatuses of imperial power and knowledge have no single, set direction or management, but these technologies ultimately bolster state power. The American empire has achieved global dominance as the world’s only remaining superpower through efficient means that avoid the costly investments of formal colonialism, recruiting into its service a variety of “state nomads,” such as private foundations and scholars in fields of strategic importance to the state. As Cumings argues, during America’s rise to global power, the state was interested in “filling the vacuum of knowledge about a vast hegemonic and counterhegemonic global space: it was the capillary lines of state power that shaped area programs.” Of these “capillary lines,” sources of funding for university-based area studies deeply influenced the character of the field, as they privileged particular regions and interpretive paradigms of study. In fields where financial support has been extremely limited, funding has provided a seductive enticement for scholars, enabling “the state to produce cheerful volunteers, ready, willing, and able to conduct research in service of empire: research that was if not at times unconsciously in service of the state, then at a minimum consciously unremarked upon” (Price 374).

The subsidizing of research, particularly through foundations collaborating with the state, drew the discursive boundaries of area studies; “ideas conformed to the availability of funding” (Price 380), and funding was consistently provided for projects serving the reciprocal needs of the state and capital. During the Cold War, capitalist logic worked in tandem with the state’s anti-communist agenda. A 1954 CIA document on foreign economic policy states:

> In the short run communism must be contained militarily. In the long run we must rely on the development, in partnership with others, of an environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve. We believe the achievement of steady economic growth is an essential part of such an environment. (Quoted in Price 384)

The financial support of scholarly research on foreign regions rendered dual effects. It recruited academics into using their expertise and credentials to support global state power. That research, in turn, helped to legitimize the U.S.’s actions abroad in the fight against communism. Development or modernization theory, which emerged as a prominent paradigm during the Cold War, claims to promote political and economic development towards the goal of liberal democracy; however, as the CIA document reveals, it provided an ideological tool in undermining communism and promoting favorable conditions for U.S. trade and investment, often at the expense of developing nations. As David
Price, an anthropologist writing on the Cold War influences over his field, states, “the role of development projects in creating debt, dependency, and strategic patron/client relationships is undeniable” (384).

Furthermore, major foundations that funded area studies in its early development—namely, Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller—fostered ideas that served the political and economic interests of the ruling class:

Functionally, these foundations serve as intergenerational antidevolutionary fortresses which protect large portions of amassed capital from inheritance and estate taxes—allowing family members to manage these funds, and direct research in areas of direct interest to the families and their investments. (Price 380).

According to Price, the Ford Foundation funded “secret military research” projects that “mostly dealt with social science methods for manipulating economic and political structures favorable to consumer capitalism in the West” (389). The needs and desires of these foundations and the state were pursued conjointly with the assistance of the witting and unwitting academics working with their resources. Moreover, by denying support to projects that contradicted U.S. interests, the funding structure effectively foreclosed the possibility that alternative viewpoints could enter public intellectual discourse: “In this way capitalism’s ‘free marketplace of ideas’ exercised ‘adaptive selection’ by adopting, nurturing, and appropriating techniques for managing or containing change within frameworks compatible with existing structures of power” (Price 381). Much scholarship among “development specialists” suffered in intellectual integrity from its service to the state, “producing a body of highly self-referential literature of a dubious academic quality” (Price 385).

Despite attempts to screen its involvement with the academy, the scandal of Operation Camelot exposed the state’s infiltration of academia and guidance of research. The U.S. Army laundered funds through American University, which administered the project, recruiting scholars to gather knowledge about countries throughout the Third World in order to contain potential social movements not in line with U.S. state and corporate interests. An internal document reveals that Operation Camelot emerged out of “the U.S. Army’s role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the less developed countries in the world,” and that the project’s main objective entailed developing a social systems theory “to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in developing nations.” (quoted in Wallerstein 220-221). Camelot essentially sought new ways of “managing national liberation movements” scattered across the globe (Simpson xxiv)—which the document reluctantly referred to as “counterinsurgency,” though it suggested “some pronounceable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better” (quoted in Wallerstein 221).

Controversy over Operation Camelot began in Chile, eventually provoking Congressional debate in the U.S. and the entire project’s termination. The project’s exposure created a crisis of ethics in the academy that forced scholars to examine thoroughly and critically the relationship between the state and their research, stimulating debate about the “use and misuse of area studies” in Cold War politics (Wallerstein 221). The revolution of 1968—which included
student movements such as the Third World Liberation Front and Third World Strike—fueled further critical self-reflection in academia, particularly within area studies. The field “came under attack by those being studied...of being in Galtung’s phase ‘scientific colonialism,’ which he defined as ‘a process whereby the center of gravity for the acquisition of knowledge about the nation is located outside the nation itself’” Wallerstein 224). Critics of area studies both within and outside the U.S. challenged not only the field’s sociopolitical role, but also its intellectual integrity as being mired in what one American critic called “a bankrupt form of ethnocentrism” (quoted in Wallerstein 226). This serious self-reflection ultimately redefined the scholar’s role and the field itself, directing both away from the goals of U.S. global dominance. It also made possible Title VI’s transfer from the NDEA to the Higher Education Act of 1968, marking a more formal separation between national defense and foreign studies education.

Area studies and social science have benefited from this development in both choice of topics and interpretive approaches to research. As Cumings states:

Because of the ferment of the 1960s, social science scholarship of the 1970s met a high standard of quality and relevance. In political science, sociology, and even to some extent economics, political economy became a rubric under which scholars produced a large body of work on the multinational corporation, the global monetary system, the world pool of labor, peripheral dependency, and U.S. hegemony itself.

The framework of political economy advanced research of importance to current trends and conditions and opened scholarship to candid criticisms of U.S. imperialism. Furthermore, Said himself contributed to this environment of self-criticism with his text, Orientalism. Published in 1978, this seminal book argues that an extensive system of cultural representations of the colonized, which Said names Orientalism, ultimately laid the groundwork that made colonialism and imperialism possible and “acted dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales” (12). Said follows the shift in imperial power from Europe to the U.S. and focuses his criticism on area studies for its intimate ties to U.S. state interests in the “newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the postcolonial world” (276). While Said commends the 1960’s revolution in several area studies fields, he notes that Middle Eastern “experts” remain bound to the state: “There is of course a Middle East studies establishment, a pool of interests, ‘old boy’ or ‘expert’ networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community together with the academic world” (301).

Said continues the debates over the relationship between academia and the state, carefully exposing the damaging effects of Orientalist scholarship:

No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary,
contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about the intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent. (327)

It overstates the case to assert that Orientalism single-handedly caused the transformative shift in area studies—the text emerged in tandem with broader debates in the field; however, Said and his work have had and continue to have widespread influence over the academy, inspiring a self-reflexive, self-critical stance towards one’s scholarship and methods. They also created the path for an entire field of inquiry, postcolonial studies, that examines the operations of imperialism and unequal global relations of power. Whereas previously much academic work supported the demands and global desires of the U.S. state and capital, this period of crisis and self-criticism ultimately opened discursive boundaries that had been effectively closed due to a lack of institutional support.

The Empire Strikes Back: The Recolonization of Area Studies

As the Cold War came to a close, conservatives motivated by global power and profit began a new assault on self-critical area studies. During this time political economy was largely replaced by rational choice theory, and development and modernization frameworks extended their influence in the field, as the reigning concern for Cold War national defense shifted to a concern for the world market. Furthermore, the demand for universities to internationalize their education programs still “does not have humanitarian or liberal instincts, since the recent initiatives are driven principally by the military and by business” (Prashad, “Confronting”). For example the 1988 reauthorization of Title VI added support to Centers for International Business Education Programs that advance “improved techniques, strategies, and methodologies in international business” (Scarfo 25). Further, in 1992 Senator David Boren of Oklahoma tried to pass through Congress the National Security Education Act (NSEA), which provided generous funding for foreign language study and research abroad in return for direct service to the government. In its stated purpose, the NSEA sought to “produce an increased pool of applicants for work in the departments and agencies of the U.S. government with national security responsibilities” (quoted in Prashad, “Confronting”). The NSEA was to be funded through and located in the Department of Defense and administered by a National Security Education Board, comprised of federal officials working in intelligence, defense, diplomacy, and commerce (Kramer 94). It resuscitated original Cold War demands for area studies, as well as its accompanying problems, provoking protest by many scholars. The area studies associations representing the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa urged their members to refuse participation in this and any other defense-related program (Cumings). Though the bill did not survive Newt Gingrich’s radical budget cuts in his effort to dismantle the welfare state, it did endure in mitigated form in the National Security Education Program (NSEP).

The logic of the national security state that justified the initial funding of area studies and re-materialized at the close of the Cold War has returned with a vengeance in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Just as the national security state emerged as an essential ideological component to the Cold War’s military-
industrial economy and “provided a catch-all justification for almost any conceivable Cold War expenditure” (Price 375), in the current era, 9/11 serves as a similar catch-all justification for the actions of the U.S. state, including the abrogation of free speech that prohibits any critique of the “war on terror.” Responding to this exposure of its vulnerability, the U.S. has “heightened nationalist discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended constitutional rights, and developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship” (Butler xi). And, “discourse itself effects violence through omission” (Butler 34). It is in this context that the arguments in favor of H.R. 3077 find a wide and receptive audience.

H.R. 3077 emerges from a multifaceted right-wing attack on the academy, perceived to be a bastion of liberal and leftist thought and criticism against the U.S. Arguments promoting H.R. 3077 find their direct foundation in the proposals of neoconservative writer Martin Kramer. Kramer’s book, *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America*, provides the base for the criticisms of area studies presented by Stanley Kurtz, the main witness in the Congressional Hearings on H.R. 3077, who refers to the book as “the most comprehensive account of the extremist bias against American foreign policy that pervades contemporary Middle Eastern studies” (“Testimony). Indeed, it seems Kurtz fulfills Kramer’s call for a reformer who will take the lead in renovating the field. In *Ivory Towers* Kramer states: “The field is ripe for change and awaits its reformers. If this critique makes their work easier, it will have served its purpose” (3). Kramer’s examination of Middle Eastern studies and his prescriptions for remedying the field by realigning it with the world of policymaking are linked to his affiliations with conservative think tanks with direct military, foreign policy, and intelligence ties. The publisher of *Ivory Towers*, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), has supported and produced conservative government officials, such as Paul Wolfowitz. Kramer edits the journal *Middle East Quarterly*, published by the Middle East Forum under the leadership of Daniel Pipes (Goldberg), an extreme right-wing advocate who also manages the Campus Watch website that blacklists faculty who criticize the Israeli state (and are therefore supposedly anti-Semitic) and encourages students to spy on their professors.

In *Ivory Towers* Kramer attacks university-based scholars of Middle Eastern studies who use theory to inform their inquiries, which he denounces for obfuscating analyses of “the real Middle East” and lacking direct relevance to national concerns (79). He blames Said for virtually single-handedly turning the field on its head by introducing the failed intellectual paradigm of theory, specifically, postcolonial theory. Kramer states:

Middle Eastern studies came under a take-no-prisoners assault, which rejected the idea of objective standards, disguised the vice of politicization as the virtue of commitment, and replaced proficiency with ideology. The text that inspired the movement was entitled *Orientalism*, and the revolution it unleashed has crippled Middle Eastern studies to this day. (22)

Kramer abhors the postcolonial theory *Orientalism* “unleashed,” because it interrupts direct access to reality, as opposed to the clear-sighted, positivist
investigations that characterized Middle Eastern studies at its founding. However, as Zachary Lockman, a New York University professor of Middle Eastern history, indicates in his response to Ivory Towers, scholars who read Orientalism did not either fully accept its arguments or “cringe in silent terror;” instead, Said’s work stimulated a complex response, in which scholars “engaged with it critically, accepting what seemed useful and rejecting, recasting, or developing other aspects.” Furthermore, Kramer’s contention that knowledge production can only be achieved through direct, unmediated access to “the real Middle East” represents “an extraordinarily naïve and unsophisticated understanding of how knowledge is produced. … [It] suggests a grave lack of self-awareness, coupled with an alarming disinterest in some of the most important scholarly debates over the past four decades or so” (Lockman). Facts do not speak for themselves, and all knowledge emerges from “some sense of how the world works” (Lockman). Yet, regardless of these scholarly debates, Kramer implies that any political commitment impedes analytical objectivity; however, his own history of working for think tanks with evident political objectives betrays his claim. On the contrary he opposes the specific politics of postcolonial theory, its critical positions towards state and imperial power, racism, and ethnocentrism. Kramer particularly faults Said’s indictment of scholarly Orientalism in supporting—directly and indirectly, wittingly and unwittingly—the project of empire-building.

According to Kramer, Middle Eastern Studies suffered a radical reduction in intellectual rigor at the hands of “Said, the aggrieved Palestinian,” who was “held to a different standard” (38). This description of Said not only signals a disturbing anti-Palestinian sentiment, particularly for a scholar of the Middle East, but also expresses nostalgia for the days of the field’s establishment with its higher standards and “disinterested objectivity so important to the founders” (16). Although Kramer holds Said responsible for corrupting Middle Eastern studies with his criticisms of its founding principles and introduction of new theoretical paradigms, he neglects the fact that scholars contemporaneous with the field’s beginnings questioned its intellectual quality and claims to objectivity, as seen in the aforementioned 1952 UNESCO International Social Science Bulletin.

Kramer endows Said with a near Messianic power to revolutionize area studies, especially Middle Eastern studies, not only in terms of the intellectual paradigm Orientalism launched, but also in terms of its “practical implications” for the racial and ethnic composition of Middle Eastern studies departments (20). He laments the decolonization of the field and cites the Middle East Research and Information Project’s (MERIP) 1971 “lengthy indictment,” which asserts: “The Middle East studies network functions as an instrument of imperialism, rather than as an objective discipline. … It is an instrument of control over the peoples of the Middle East” (quoted in Kramer 20). MERIP directly challenges the claim of objectivity as concealing U.S. imperialist goals in the region. Yet, instead of disputing MERIP’s claims with evidence to the contrary, Kramer dismisses them by accusing these students of using a political argument as an “academic grievance” against their professors of the establishment, who “could no longer guarantee them jobs” due to the fluctuations of the academic marketplace (20). He claims that as these students rose through the ranks to become the faculty of the field, Said’s works offered them the intellectual legitimacy they needed to establish their careers. Kramer entirely dismisses the self-criticism Middle
Eastern studies experienced as “a crisis of self-confidence” of the field’s founders, who consequently failed to defend their scholarship against Said’s destructive influence: “Some scholars began to wonder whether they were wearing the epistemological blinders which Said called ‘Orientalism:’ a contemptuous refusal to see Arabs and Muslims in all their human dynamism” (37, Kramer’s emphasis). Apparently Kramer disapproves of such self-reflection, especially when it regards treating the people Orientalists study not as objects but as human beings.

He further asserts that Orientalism unfairly privileged people of color in the academy, as it became a “manifesto of affirmative action for Arab and Muslim scholars and established a negative predisposition toward American scholars” (38). Kramer blatantly states that “Orientalism insinuated an ethnic test for admission to the field,” even while admitting that this assertion is “undocumentable” (38-39). Yet, as evidence of this “ethnic test,” he cites the fact that in 1971, “only 16.7 percent [of Middle East area specialists] had the language and foreign-residence profiles coincident with a Middle Eastern background” (39). For all of his praise to the field’s founders for their keen skills of direct observation and access to “the real Middle East,” Kramer reveals serious deficiencies of expertise in his role models, such as proficiency in languages like Arabic or Farsi and extended periods of fieldwork in the region. Nevertheless, he asserts that Orientalism allowed many Arab and Muslim scholars to enter the field “due not to any individual competence” but to their supposed “collective innocence of orientalist bias” (34), even though Said, indeed, states the opposite: “It is not the thesis of this book…to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an ‘insider’ perspective over an ‘outsider’ one. … I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth” (Orientalism 322). Nevertheless, Kramer argues that this compositional makeover among the scholars of the field facilitated the intellectual shift away from Orientalist paradigms: “In fact, so total an ‘ideological transformation’ … would not have taken place had there not been a massive shift in the ethnic composition of Middle Eastern studies” (39). Kramer suggests that less qualified Arab and Muslim scholars were unable to produce the kind of rigorous scholarship within the already established parameters of the field and thus needed to use the illegitimate paradigm of theory introduced by Said in order to infiltrate the academy.

In his bid to return Middle Eastern studies to its (ig)noble past, Kramer condemns the field’s distancing itself from the U.S. government. He disparages Title VI, even in its original form under the NDEA, for allowing fund recipients autonomy from federal control and concurs with Strom Thurmond’s opposition to it for its “unbelievable remoteness from national defense considerations” (quoted in Kramer 85). Kramer argues that despite this failure of the legislation, the founders of Cold War Middle Eastern studies were patriotic, dependable sources of support to the national security state. He does acknowledge that the state had “overreached” with Operation Camelot (86), but contends that the episode unjustly tainted perceptions of academics working with the government and argues that this unreasonable distrust of state ties had no basis in reality. As proof, he cites a 1973 survey of area specialists in which “only 2.6 percent of specialists reported ever receiving research support from the Department of Defense” (100, footnote 12). However, Kramer totally ignores the fact that the
Department of Defense, along with other branches of the national security state, laundered funds through re-granting agencies such as the Fulbright-Hayes and university-based area studies programs. As Cumings states, “even powerful Senators complain that the very ‘oversight’ committees responsible for monitoring the CIA have been ignored and subverted.”

Kramer continues his tirade against Middle Eastern studies for assuming ethical positions against state funds that required more direct federal control over grant recipients. He accuses the Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA), the leading academic association for the field, of boycotting the NSEP for political, not ethical, reasons. However, Cumings emphasizes the legitimacy of MESA’s concerns, including NSEP’s threat to “the integrity of academic processes.” Area specialists were also concerned that students studying abroad would be suspected of working for state intelligence, thus compromising not only the quality of field research but also the safety of students. However, Kramer dismisses such protestations, at one point making the extreme claim that state involvement with academic work abroad “created no danger to American scholars that Said’s … libels had not created already” (90). He states:

Edward Said’s Covering Islam had made its way into the hands of Islamic Jihad in Lebanon. In its authoritative pages, the real kidnappers could read that in America, all Middle East scholars were “affiliated to the mechanisms by which national policy is set. This is not a matter of choice for the individual scholar. (90)

This dubious argument faults the author of a text for the ways in which his work is appropriated once released into the world of readers. In this move of logistical gymnastics, Kramer blames the critique of an existing system—the national security state’s deep involvement with area studies—that endangers people’s lives, not the system itself. In fact he cannot acknowledge the real source of peril without destabilizing his entire argument—that the relationship between the state and scholarship only generates relevant intellectual work of high quality.

However, the outrage of his argument here lies in his implicit accusation that Said’s scholarship aids terrorist acts, a terrible insinuation he repeats on multiple occasions—from the kidnappings in Lebanon (46 and 90); to the assassination of Malcolm Kerr, president of American University in Beirut (46); to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (56-57). Kramer’s oblique charge of Said as an aid to terrorism constitutes a powerful form of censorship that operates at the level of the individual speaker and of society at large. Such a defamatory label draws the boundaries of acceptable speech and—through the exclusion of intolerable utterances, like criticism of the American state—of the public sphere itself. Furthermore, in reducing criticism of the U.S. state to concurrence with agents of terrorism, the line of reasoning embedded in Kramer’s contention coincides with the logic of George W. Bush’s administration—“You’re with us, or you’re with the terrorists.” This argument forecloses the possibility of simultaneously condemning the acts of brutal violence committed by both the U.S. and the terrorists and inhibits critically examining the relationship between these polarized opponents. Kramer further contends that Middle Eastern studies under Said’s sinister influence “contributed to the public complacency about terrorism that ultimately left the United States
vulnerable to ‘surprise’ attack by Islamists,” making reference to September 11th only a few sentences later (57). He casts a heinous charge against Said, a self-described humanist critical of “the politics of identity and partition …that seem to require killing rather than living” (Said, Humanism, 77). Yet, the very heinous nature of the charge itself serves as a testament to Said’s courage to continue to speak in spite of this burden he was forced to bear.

As an alternative to the dangerously misguided scholarship found in university-based Middle Eastern studies, Kramer espouses the model fostered by the right-wing think tanks that support him and his like-minded colleagues. As opposed to the Middle Eastern studies centers that have refused to produce knowledge useful to foreign policy, think tanks have “progressively colonized the public domain” (105) through their “ability to formulate and present ideas in the accepted public discourse of the national interest” (107). While he aptly describes think tanks’ spreading influence as colonizing the public sphere, Kramer assumes that serving the national interest constitutes the best framework for knowledge production, because it is the “accepted public discourse;” he does not (and cannot) concede any validity in questioning the basis of this acceptance by the public. Indeed, Kramer seems to have his causal logic reversed. As Said argues, the public domain has been “densely saturated” by think tanks and mainstream media outlets, which “bear centrally on the acceptance of a neoliberal postwelfare state responsive neither to the citizenry nor to the natural environment, but to a vast structure of global corporations unrestricted by traditional barriers or sovereignties” (Humanism 124). Kramer uses circular reasoning, in which think tanks produce the accepted public discourse that then justifies the value of their research. On a more fundamental level, Kramer measures the value of scholarship on the basis of its application to the national interest. However, “the influence of research and the merit of that research are not necessarily one and the same thing—Ivory Towers on Sand being a case in point,” Lockman argues. Furthermore, “[Kramer’s] book demonstrates no interest whatsoever in the uses to which such knowledge might be put or in the question of the responsibility of intellectuals to maintain their independence, or indeed in what scholarship and intellectual life should really be about” (Lockman).

Instead, Kramer’s nostalgia for the (imperial) origins of Middle Eastern studies drives his entire thesis. He even praises the “very rich patrimony of scholarly Orientalism” (122), stating: “Orientalism had heroes. Middle Eastern studies have none, and they never will, unless and until scholars of the Middle East restore some continuity with the great tradition” (123). Here lies the source of Kramer’s passionate denunciation of Said. In his effort to re-colonize Middle Eastern studies and the academy, Kramer attacks the significant intellectual figure and interpretive framework that exposed his and his colleagues’ racist, imperialist interpretations of the world. Said effectively delegitimizes Kramer and his scholarship. Yet, in this period following September 11th, the U.S. nation-state has become all too uncritically receptive to the kinds of interpretations that Kramer provides.

Clearly, Kramer argues, university-based Middle Eastern studies, crippled under the influence of Said, is incapable of changing itself and thus needs external coercion to reform. In order to amend the regrettable transformation of area studies, Kramer recycles many of the proposals of the failed NSEA and
recommends revising the stipulations for Title VI funding to Middle Eastern studies centers. He suggests legislating greater emphasis on “outreach” to the public sphere, especially to the federal government, as well as including non-academics in the Title VI review process. Kramer states:

Peer review is a vital element in academic life, and it has no substitute in myriad internal procedures of academic appointments and promotions. But selection of National Resource Centers should not be treated as an internal academic procedure if its purpose is to select those best placed to impart their “excellence” beyond academe. (128)

Moreover, he indicates the cost of Title VI funding to Middle Eastern studies centers, which, at four million dollars, amounts to the cost of five Tomahawk cruise missiles (126). His comparison of higher education to military arms, as well as his assertion of the true purpose of Middle Eastern studies, highlights his insistence that the field must be forcefully reincorporated into the security apparatus of the state.

H.R. 3077 and Attacks on Academic Freedom

Kramer nearly received his wish with the passage of H.R. 3077 through the House of Representatives. His fellow neoconservative critic, Stanley Kurtz, made efficient use of his arguments, condensing his major points into a cogent, brief testimony before Congress, as well as several articles for the National Review Online. In the short time he was given to speak at the hearing on Title VI, Kurtz managed to attack Edward Said, accuse area studies of driving out scholars who support U.S. foreign policy, use the “anti-American” label three times, and condemn the boycott of NSEP by three major area associations as undermining national security. Though he bases his claims on his “recent research into the operations of Title VI” (“Testimony), the breadth of his inquiry seems limited to *Ivory Towers*; he uses the same rhetoric as Kramer in equating criticism of the U.S. state with shame (a word he uses four times) and manipulating fears of future terrorist attacks. He uses the following example: “We know that transmissions from the September 11 highjackers went untranslated for want of Arabic speakers in our intelligence agencies. … [T]he directors of the Title VI African studies centers who voted unanimously, just after September 11, to reaffirm their boycott of the NSEP, have all acted to undermine America’s national security” (“Testimony).

Kurtz primarily contends that Middle Eastern studies, among other area-based fields, “tend to purvey extreme and one-sided criticisms of American foreign policy” (“Testimony”). Because the faculty and viewpoints fostered in Title VI-funded programs are “ideologically unbalanced,” academic freedom has been effectively curtailed by the left-wing radicals who have overtaken area studies and driven out supporters of the American state. Despite his claims that he is “not arguing that authors like Edward Said ought to be banned from Title VI-funded centers” (“Testimony”), Michelle Goldberg, senior writer for *Salon Magazine* and author of *Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism*, suggests that Kurtz adds this qualification in order to dismiss accusations that he is trying to muzzle American critics. She quotes Kurtz’s colleague, Daniel Pipes, as
offering more forthright statements that reveal the true intent behind the push for reform: "I want Noam Chomsky to be taught at universities about as much as I want Hitler’s writing or Stalin’s writing. These are wild and extremist ideas that I believe have no place in a university." Furthermore, Kurtz states, “free speech...is not an entitlement to a government subsidy” ("Testimony"). He proposes three major changes, inspired by Kramer’s suggestions: 1) create an advisory board composed of government and public appointees, including officials such as the National Security Advisor, and heads of think tanks; 2) strip funds from any center that impedes national security related funding programs; and 3) reduce the overall funding of Title VI until Deans and Provosts work to amend their centers by bringing in a more diverse range of political perspectives.

While Kurtz’s third proposal was too extreme to be included, the passage of H.R. 3077 through the House marked a victory for both Kurtz and Kramer. H.R. 3077 adopts their rhetoric and incorporates their major revisions into Title VI; it also affirms the U.S.’s reversion to an endless state of emergency characteristic of the Cold War. The Act opens with a statement that emphasizes its relation to the crisis caused by 9/11:

The events and aftermath of September 11, 2001, have underscored the need for the nation to strengthen and enhance American knowledge of international relations, world regions, and foreign languages. Homeland security and effective United States engagement abroad depend upon an increased number of Americans who have received such training and are willing to serve their nation.

In light of the state’s needs in this era of “homeland security,” H.R. 3077 orders the Secretary of Education to consider the degree to which the centers applying for grants “advance national interests, generate and disseminate information, and foster debate on American foreign policy from diverse perspectives.” To assist the Secretary in making such assessments, the bill proposes creating the International Higher Education Advisory Board, which is composed of seven members: two appointed by the House, two by the Senate, and three by the Secretary, two of whom must “represent Federal agencies that have national security responsibilities.” The Board has no direct control over the educational content of the centers it appraises: “Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the International Advisory Board to mandate, direct, or control an institution of higher education’s specific instructional content, curriculum, or program of instruction.” However, while this stipulation gives nominal academic freedom to the centers affected by Title VI, the Board nevertheless has broad powers “to study, monitor, apprise, and evaluate a sample of activities supported under this title.”

In spite of the ostensible protections included in the language of the Act, H.R. 3077 would infringe on academic freedom, as part of the broader attack on any utterance that opposes the U.S. state. However, though other Congressional witnesses argued against Kurtz’s claims as a “triumph of ideology over analysis” (Hartle, “Testimony”), none directly challenged his proposal to create the advisory board, nor questioned the logic of linking scholarship to the national security state. None argued that knowledge production itself
constitutes a social good. In fact both witnesses who disputed Kurtz—Terry Hartle, senior vice president of the education lobby American Council on Education (ACE), and Gilbert Merkx, Vice Provost for International Affairs and Director of the Center for International Studies at Duke University—argued that Title VI already benefits the state in terms of foreign policy, national security, and international commerce as the grounds for renewing this source of federal funding. Furthermore, Hartle, the only witness to challenge Kurtz’s vilification of Said and postcolonial theory, employed a weak and misguided line of defense, stating that Said’s influence “reached its apex of popularity more than ten years ago and has been waning ever since” (“Testimony”). By not defending Said on the basis of the quality of his scholarship or the merits of his influence, Hartle effectively gives credence to Kurtz’s attacks. Following the Congressional hearing, many academic organizations failed to dispute the national security state’s recruitment of knowledge production and education into its service. Indeed, the ACE ultimately supported H.R. 3077, despite its misgivings. Hartle later states: “Stanley Kurtz is someone who is looking for a conspiracy behind every tree, but that doesn’t mean a properly constructed advisory committee has to be a threat” (quoted in Goldberg). And the Coalition for International Education (CIE) asserts that “we have no objection to the creation of an advisory board,” even though it may “set a precedent for Federal intervention in the conduct and content of higher education.”

The CIE expresses legitimate and critical concerns relating to state encroachment on the academic freedoms vital to the mission of the university and the purpose of higher education. Yet, Kurtz alleges that de-funding a center on the basis of ideological imbalance does not technically infringe on academic freedom: “It would be inappropriate for Congress to ban any particular viewpoint in the programs it supports. But it is not illegitimate for Congress to declare a preference to give to grant applications from programs that offer students a wide range of perspectives on international affairs” (“Reforming”). However, as scarce funding sources for higher education pose a perennial problem for the humanities and social sciences, stripping a center of its Title VI funds would, in fact, disable that center from functioning. Rashid Khalidi, director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, a Title VI-funded center, describes the threat of H.R. 3077 as “deadly serious” (quoted in Goldberg). For Kurtz, the bill merely “offers ‘gentle’ incentives for academics to mend their wayward ways” by broadening the boundaries of intellectual discourse to include perspectives in line with the U.S. state (Lockman). However, Kurtz betrays this assertion by referring to the intimidation the Advisory Board could create: “But with a board in place, it would be that much more difficult to run a secret boycott. Dissenters could always expose political boycotts to the board. What’s more, potential boycotters would know this, and that would keep them in check” (“Hearing”). Kurtz praises the potential of the Board to promote scholars’ spying on each other, as well as its ability to subdue scholars’ resistance to the state. His disturbing approval of this climate of intimidation recalls the conditions of Cold War area studies in which scholars “consulted with the government or risked being investigated by the FBI” (Cumings). Moreover, it provides insight into Kurtz’s true motivation for promoting the Board.

The “ideological balance” within Title VI centers that Kurtz encourages cannot be achieved “without determining the political views of the faculty and
students involved by some sort of means of surveillance or background checking” (Scholes B13). As Robert Post states in his lucid analysis of academic freedom:

[H.R. 3077] uses an overtly political standard to override norms of professional competence and relevance. It would thus be incompatible with academic freedom for a university to impose this standard of “diverse perspectives” on its faculty in any decisions regulating teaching or research. The same would be true, a fortiori, for the Act’s requirement that Title VI centers serve the “national interests.” (47)

Post argues that academic freedom constitutes not only a freedom of speech, but also a professional right essential to the production of knowledge—a social good that the public requires. As a right tied to the unique role of the scholar, academic freedom is guaranteed by the enforcement of professional norms among scholars themselves, norms which “cannot with safety” be imposed from external organizations (quoted in Post 19). H.R. 3077’s Advisory Board and demand for serving national interests contradict the fundamental principles of academic freedom and endanger the university and its service to society. The bill threatens to convert the university into a proprietary institution that “merely promotes ‘opinions held by …persons who provide the funds for its maintenance” (Post 48). Despite Kurtz’s dubious claims to the contrary, the “gentle incentives” (more aptly described as “deadly serious” threats) of H.R. 3077 do not in any way uphold the values of the university or academic freedom. But he and his colleagues most likely realize this fact. As Amy Newhall, Executive Director of MESA, states: “Proponents certainly see it as intrusive.’ In fact, ‘they’re looking forward to it.’” (Jacobson A9).

Kurtz, Kramer, and their allies anticipate turning the university into a proprietary institution that endorses their views on the world and the U.S.’s relation to it. However, the repercussions of H.R. 3077 are not isolated to the university. As Prashad states: “All political groups should take this seriously: it is not just about the academy, but also about the attempt to make the academy into the emissary of Empire” (“Confronting”). This attack on higher education and knowledge production comprises only one part of a larger trend to suppress all forms of dissent, wherever they may be uttered. Goldberg compares this attack on scholarship to the condemnation of U.S. intelligence agencies when they could not confirm the conservative assumptions that justified invading Iraq. She quotes Khalidi: “They’re not just after academics. You see this inside the military, inside the intelligence community. You see this in the way the State Department has been treated. … Unless you have the right views you are not allowed to speak, and if you do, you do so at your peril.” The intelligence agencies and other apparatuses already serving the national security state are not immune from censure when they fail to fall in line with its demands, even when that failure is founded on reason and fact—as was the case with the CIA’s finding no evidence of weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein.

Intellectual freedom and the freedom to express critical views of the nation-state are fundamental to a vibrant democracy. It is imperative that neoconservative proponents of American global ambitions not be allowed to
overtake the academy and remake it in their image. However, education advocates, such as Hartle and Merkx, have offered weak defenses of area studies that do not fight for the right of universities to nurture knowledge production and teaching free from the grip of the national security state. The delay of outspoken opposition to the neoconservative agenda embedded in H.R. 3077 made possible its passage through the House of Representatives. And even though the bill never passed the Senate committee on Housing, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), its underlying logic of correcting the supposed ideological imbalance of the academy is currently morphing into new forms of state and federal legislation, spearheaded by the well-organized movement called Students for Academic Freedom (SAF).

Lead by David Horowitz, an ex-leftist neoconservative and president of the Individual Rights foundation, SAF seeks to establish “intellectual diversity” not only in the field of area studies, but throughout university campuses, particularly in the humanities, social sciences, and the arts. It disguises its political program in liberal language. As Horowitz states:

I encourage them [conservative students] to use the language that the left has deployed so effectively in behalf of its own agenda. Radical professors have created a “hostile learning environment” for conservative students. There is a lack of “intellectual diversity” on college faculties and in academic classrooms. The conservative viewpoint is “under-represented” in the curriculum and on its reading lists. The university should be an “inclusive” and intellectually “diverse” community. (“The Campus Blacklist”)

Spreading its agenda through the Internet, SAF promotes the “Academic Bill of Rights,” which uses the rhetoric of academic freedom as what Stanley Fish, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, calls “the Trojan horse of a dark design” (“Intellectual Diversity,” B13). Horowitz created a template bill of rights for university administrators and state and federal legislators to write into university policy and law. Although it does not advocate a specific advisory board like H.R. 3077, the bill’s proposed enforcement strategy nonetheless “threatens to impose administrative and legislative oversight on the professional judgment of faculty, to deprive professors of the authority necessary for teaching, and to prohibit academic institutions from making the decisions that are necessary for the advancement of knowledge” (AAUP, “Statement”). The American Association of University Professors asserts that the Academic Bill of Rights “infringes on the academic freedom in the very act of purporting to protect it” (“Statement”). As Horowitz himself demonstrates, this irony is not coincidental.

SAF has found a wide basis of support among students and legislators across the U.S. Conservative politicians have been trying to pass multiple state and federal laws over the past few years. While most efforts to make an academic bill of rights become state law have not met complete success, the ideology of this movement is infiltrating political debates regarding the academy as well as the academy itself. For example when Colorado’s Bill 04-1315 passed through the House education committee, the presidents of several state-funded universities voluntarily adopted the resolutions of the academic bill of rights,
provided the bill be dropped from the legislative agenda (Horowitz, “Victory”). This compromise resulted in the “memorandum of understanding,” which states, “Colorado’s institutions of higher education are committed to valuing and respecting diversity, including respect for diverse political viewpoints.” On the federal level, the College Access and Opportunity Act (H.R. 609), which revises and renews the Higher Education Act, includes new language based on Horowitz’s academic bill of rights. The bill passed the House Committee on Education and Labor in July 2005 (with no Democratic support) and will be debated in the full House during the 109th Session of Congress.

Although none of these proposed laws carry the severe measure of defunding an “ideologically imbalanced” institution, they and the larger SAF movement are producing fear in the academy. As Prashad asserts: “Faculty fear that the campus will be overrun by a thought police, administrators fear lawsuits and adverse publicity. Fear is corrosive, and even as the faculty might not hire right-wing faculty to “balance” their departments, they have already allowed the Right to set the agenda with more and more demands” (“An Academic”). Furthermore, like the neoconservative activists behind H.R. 3077, Horowitz also reduces criticism of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East as supporting terrorism, as seen in his 2004 book Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left.

As H.R. 3077 and its descendents in the SAF movement cultivate this climate of fear, they contribute to the interpretive framework for understanding the world that has emerged in the aftermath of 9/11. This framework forecloses all varieties of criticisms of the U.S. state as indistinguishable from support for terrorist violence, and, as Judith Butler argues, thereby defines the public sphere “by certain kinds of exclusions, certain emerging patterns of censoriousness and censorship” (126). The threat of being labeled a “traitor” or “terrorist sympathizer” generates a form of self-censorship by those who cannot bear these horrible stigmatizations. However, Butler asserts:

If we bury our criticism for fear of being labeled..., we give power to those who want to curtail the free expression of political beliefs. To live with the charge is, of course, terrible, but it is less terrible when you know that it is untrue, and one can only have this knowledge if there are others who are speaking with you, and who can help to support the sense of what you know. (121)

The public intellectual, whom Said describes as “a guide to the confusing present” (Humanism 121), must “challenge and defeat both an imposed silence and the normalized quiet of unseen power wherever and whenever possible” (Humanism 135). Scholars, intellectuals, and all other persons invested in protecting an ever fragile democracy should take inspiration from Said’s words and from his courage to continue to utter those words and resist attempts to usurp “the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices” (Humanism 71).
Endnotes

A. Naomi Paik is a graduate student in the American Studies Program at Yale University. I thank the members of the Working Group on Globalization and Culture 2004-2005 for their contributions to shaping this paper, which was first presented at the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Title VI originated in the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and was subsequently transferred to the Higher Education Act in 1968.

In addition to Etienne Balibar’s assertion that racism and nationalism are inextricably linked, Leti Volpp argues that September 11th has consolidated a U.S. national identity that is strongly patriotic and multiracial through opposition to the new construction of “the Middle Eastern terrorist,” a new racial category that includes (those persons who appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim...wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists and disidentified as citizens” (1575).

Recent events of the “war on terror” and “Operation Enduring Freedom” clearly deviate from this trajectory of informal imperial control. Furthermore, there are examples of direct conquest in U.S. history, such as the annexations of Hawai’i and Mexican territories and the colonization of the Philippines.

Wallerstein notes that while Operation Camelot focused on Latin America nations, it included “three in the Middle East, four in the Far East, one in Africa, and even two in Europe (France and Greece)” (222).

Johan Galtung, a recruited Norwegian scholar, who declined on principle and helped expose Operation Camelot, wrote to the project coordinator of Chile: “Being Norwegian is more to the point: Project Camelot looks different from the point of view of the top nation in one of the power blocs. ... [M]ore than ‘a few professors’ were appalled by the project and refused indignantly to participate in it; in fact, there have probably been few issues that have united empiricists, phenomenologists, and Marxists alike as effectively.” (quoted in Wallerstein 223).

Since writing this response, Lockman has also become director of NYU’s Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, which receives Title VI funding.

Beyond signaling a general disdain for affirmative action as preferential treatment for non-white people, Kramer betrays an Orientalist perspective in this statement by establishing a fundamental distinction dividing the category of “Arab and Muslim” from “American.” He implies that “American” means racially white and, therefore, Arab and Muslim scholars (among others) cannot inhabit this subjectivity.

Cumings notes that the area associations for Latin America and Africa also joined in a boycott of the NSEP.

Judith Butler argues that accusatory labels such as “anti-Semitic” (in the context of criticizing the Israeli state’s acts of violence) and “terrorist sympathizer” are “threats with profound psychological consequence” (127). In the case of “anti-Semitism,” she states: “To say, effectively, that anyone who utters their heartache and outrage out loud will be considered (belatedly, and by powerful ‘listeners’) as anti-Semitic, is to seek to control the kind of speech that circulates in the public sphere, to terrorize with the charge of anti-Semitism, and to
produce a climate of fear through the tactical use of a heinous judgment with which no progressive person would want to identify.” (120-121)

x This condition keeps H.R. 3077 in line with the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, which prohibits any federal infringement of academic independence.

xi A University of Texas history student, Michael Bednar, initiated a letter writing campaign, sending mass emails (dated 20 October 2003) to other students and faculty summarizing the House debates on H.R. 3077 and asking them to send hand-written letters to their respective Congressional representatives. The American Association of University Professors eventually joined the cause and helped spread the drive to intervene in the Bill’s passage through the Senate through its Legislative Action Alert.

(xhttp://www.aaup.org/govrel/ActionCenter/31804alert.htm 18 March 2004)

xii Students for Academic Freedom’s website includes template documents, instructions on how to start a local chapter of SAF, news articles and reports, responses to critics, a discussion boards, and an “academic freedom complaint form,” where students can post testimonies of strife under liberal professors. Their mottos is, “You can’t get a good education if they’re only telling you half the story.” (http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/)

xiii Student governments at universities and colleges, including Utah State University and Occidental College, have adopted a Student Bill of Rights based on the template offered on SAF’s website (Hebel, A18).

In a more extreme case, the Bruin Alumni Association of the University of California at Los Angeles has also joined this battle against the “exploding crisis of political radicalism on campus” and has even offered to pay students up to $100 to record classroom lectures of “suspect” professors.


xiv So far, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington have legislation proposing an academic bill of rights. Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives passed its version, H.R. 177, establishing a committee to examine issues of “academic freedom.” The committee plans to submit a full report to the House by November 2006. (AAUP, “State Legislation Proposing an ‘Academic Bill of Rights’”).

xv See Section 103 of H.R. 609, “Student Speech and Association Rights” (pages 19-21). The primary additions deriving from Horowitz’s language are as follows:

(2) an institution of higher education should ensure that a student attending such institution on a full- or part-time basis is--

(A) evaluated solely on the basis of their reasoned answers and knowledge of the subjects and disciplines they study and without regard to their political, ideological, or religious beliefs;

(B) assured that the selection of speakers and allocation of funds for speakers, programs, and other student activities will utilize methods that promote intellectual pluralism and include diverse viewpoints;

(C) presented diverse approaches and dissenting sources and viewpoints within the instructional setting; and
(D) not excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination or official sanction on the basis of their political or ideological beliefs under any education program, activity, or division of the institution directly or indirectly receiving financial assistance under this Act, whether or not such program, activity, or division is sponsored or officially sanctioned by the institution.

xvi H.R. 609 also includes some of the most drastic cuts in federal spending on student loan programs ever, diverting what could amount to $11 billion from higher education funding to reducing the deficit (Pekow 8).

xvii However, Representative Charlie Norwood of Georgia did sponsor a failed amendment that would de-fund international and area studies centers that support “anti-American” activities and a “blame America first” worldview (Burd and Bollag, A24).

xviii The National Review bookservice states in its review of Horowitz’s text: “In Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left, David Horowitz demonstrates that the anti-war movement is just part of a larger pattern: the American left has made alliances of convenience with Islamic radicals who have declared war on the democratic West. In doing so, they have actively obstructed the war on terror, undermined our national defense, and threatened us all.” (their emphasis) http://www.nrbookservice.com/products/bookpage.asp?prod_cd=c6544

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