Liberal Che Guevaras: Projecting Civil Society in the Former Second World

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Since 1989, all former Soviet allies in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the three Baltic states have without much hesitation made a Euro-Atlantic choice in their foreign policies. At the same time, Russia has been following an increasingly separate, Eurasian course.\(^1\) The remaining former Soviet republics have gradually developed what is called now “illiberal” or “controlled” democracies without committing themselves to a firm (pro-Russian/CIS\(^2\) or pro-Western) geopolitical orientation, often preferring to either juggle these two or maintain a somewhat autarkic international position.

Over the past five years, however, three revolutions have taken place in the region, disturbing this seemingly settled state of affairs. Inspired by the manner in which protestors toppled the then Yugoslavian government, the broad oppositional coalitions of the Republic of Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently in Kyrgyzstan have taken over power from the entrenched regimes in their respective countries. A few more such regime changes in the post-Soviet space are being widely speculated. Unlike the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, this series of non-violent yet confrontational regime changes has so far taken five years, and may take even longer before exhausting its force. Despite such an extended time-span, most observers see these events as parts of one and the same sociopolitical movement. Hence, the similar nomenclature: Rose Revolution in Georgia, Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. The main reason for this perception lies in the almost identical sequence of events by which the revolutions take place. Yet just as significantly, the revolutions have been unified by the decisive role youth groups (Otpor in Serbia, Kmara! in Georgia, Pora in Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, KelKel in Kyrgyzstan) have played in each country.\(^3\) The goals these youth groups share

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1 Eurasianism is one of the many ways to intellectualize Russia’s age-old quest for a “separate way.” Formally initiated by Russian émigrés in the 1920s-1930s, this civilizational and geopolitical discourse maintains that Russia’s identity lies in Asia as much as it does in Europe. (In this sense, Eurasianism has a different orientation from Slavophilism, which has traditionally maintained an emphasis on Russia’s privileged relationship with other Slavic peoples.) Besides an appreciation for the Asian ethnocultural heritage and a syndicalist/corporatist model of government (which many call fascist), Eurasianism typically involves a confrontation between the Eurasian and the Western civilizations. The reason I privilege it over some other currents of contemporary Russian nationalism is that Eurasian discourse is gaining currency among Russia’s governing circles. For a more thorough discussion of this ideology, please refer to Osnovy Evraziistva: Antologìja, ed. Alexander Dugin. Moscow: Arktogea Center, 2002.

2 CIS is the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russia-led organizations of most former Soviet republics.

3 My discussion will center on the youth groups in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine for less information is available about KelKel’s role in the events in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the underlying forces in that Central Asian republic may have been different, given the country’s clan-based structure. A number of observers have commented on the riot-like nature of the events in
(ensuring democracy through fair elections, which in practice translates to opposing the incumbent government’s electoral behavior) and their common Europhilic orientation have been reinforced by very similar organizational practices. The set of symbols first seen in Belgrade in 2000, then in Tbilisi in 2003, and a year later in Kiev reinvigorated civic discourse, bringing many young Eastern European men and women out of their former political apathy. Each symbolic system reflected that particular country’s national specificity; yet it also revealed global and regional connections to an extent unimaginable in 1989. After all, these youth groups were reading similar texts on non-violent resistance, and following their victories at home, have taken to spreading their experience to countries where such regime change is possible. None of them denies the role international NGOs and their regional colleagues have played in its formation. The use of English and internet has also facilitated the internationalization of these revolutions. This intense regional and international exchange of revolutionary expertise among youth groups has not only integrated the events in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine into a single narrative, but also promises other regional regime changes in the future.

Two main narratives compete to explain these youth movements: one, most popular with Western media, views these Eastern European youth as resuming the work of their democratically-minded predecessors at the end of the perestroika era; the other one, more popular in Russia and other CIS countries, claims that the young revolutionaries represent the interface of foreign influence. Both interpretations are, in a sense, correct. These demonstrators in Belgrade, Tbilisi and Kiev did bring down governments that were objectively autocratic, corrupt and otherwise bad. Like their Eastern European predecessors in the late 1980s, these governments ineptly tried to ossify the socio-political process taking place in their countries. On the other hand, these regime changes were as much of a product of local forces as they were of Western help. Both of these narratives, correct as they may be, fail to focus on the crucial change in the notion of civil society that has taken place

Kyrgyzstan and the redistribution of the drug markets accompanying them as reasons for their reluctance to place them alongside the other revolutions. Most importantly for this paper, because of the country’s geopolitical position, Europhilia did not constitute a significant factor. For more information, please, refer to Smith, Craig. “Kyrgyzstan’s Shining Hour Ticks Away and Turns Out To Be a Plain, Old Coup.” New York Times. 2 April 2005. Lexis Nexis. 3 May 2005 http://web.lexis-nexis.com. And if the nature of Kyrgyz events made this revolution a less-than-ideal candidate for this discussion, the tragedy that struck Uzbekistan on May 12 2005 falls beyond the scope of this paper. Although that country shares the “illiberal democracy” status of most former Soviet republics, and many of its consequences, very different socio-political processes are at play there.
since 1989, a change of which these youth groups were the most spectacular product. If previously “civil” referred to one’s individual consciousness as a citizen of his state, now the term has come to include participation in globalized civil society, comprising networks of international and local NGOs. To a greater degree than the adults who stood alongside them, the young people who took to the streets 2000, 2003 and 2004 were part of the structures and networks of civil society that did not exist in 1989. These structures and networks made the revolution possible in the first place, but also pose the risk of robbing the young activists of their initiative, and ceding it to the politics of international NGOs and their donors.

“A ghost is haunting Europe…”
Karl Marx

The past five years have seen a number of revolutions in Eastern Europe. Following a remarkably similar sequence of events, demonstrators brought down the Slobodan Milosevic’s government in Yugoslavia (October 2000), Edward Shevarnadze’s in the Republic of Georgia (November 2003), prevented the unfair election of Viktor Yanukovich, helping Viktor Yushchenko’s victory in the contested election (November/ December 2004), and made Askar Aliev’s re-election as President of Kyrgyzstan impossible (March 2005). All of these revolutions focused on elections that, had they not been contested, would have kept the incumbent government of the country in power. The leading opposition figures, quite frequently themselves members of a previous government, formed very broad coalitions around a generally Western-leaning, nationalist (in this context, anti-Russian) and liberal agenda to challenge the incumbents. In the run-up to each election, the government-controlled media ignored or covered the opposition parties unfavorably. In the Yugoslav case, election results, in which the united opposition candidate Voislav Kostunica was clearly the winner, were not even announced; in all other countries electoral fraud was alleged. Legal challenges of the validity of the elections, and sometimes self-inaugurations on part of opposition leaders accompanied the street demonstrations. These elements, of course, would have been unthinkable in the 1989 revolutions.

In all but Yugoslavia (where because of the country’s very autarkic international situation, foreign observers did not play a significant role), Western governmental and non-governmental monitors seconded the allegations while their counterparts from CIS declared the election fair. In each case, a stand-off then ensued between the local government and the united opposition, which called upon citizens to come out on the streets. Meanwhile,
Western governments made their support for the opposition increasingly explicit; Russia did likewise for the incumbents, with whom it had established a *modus vivendi* (except for Milosevic, of course). Such overt international involvement in individual country’s electoral affairs would have been impossible during the events of 1989 when Gorbachev affirmed each country’s right to self-determination, and the West’s direct means of influence on each Central and Eastern European country were significantly more limited. There were numerous other, less obvious, factors involved in the successful outcomes of each revolution, ranging from the reluctance of police and military forces to suppress popular demonstrations to the support many businesses or institutions gave to the oppositional forces.

Not all attempted revolutions materialized. A similar sequence of events took place in Belarus in 2004, but Alexander Lukashenko’s firmer control over the institutions of power as well as the country’s relative impermeability to Western influence (and a whole host of other factors) resulted in the revolution’s suppression. On a smaller scale, the same happened after the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, both in 2003. It is not, of course, the purpose of this paper to give a detailed analysis of these recent phenomena, but rather to show how their similar morphology resulted in the current perception of a whole wave of revolutions, not unlike those of 1989, that is now methodically sweeping through post-Soviet space.

The popular (especially journalistic) imagination quickly inserted a number of other instances of unrest in the former Soviet Union into this revolutionary narrative. The January protests of Russian pensioners, who would have been affected by the so-called monetarization of their benefits, were quickly dubbed in the Western media “the babushka revolution.” Needless to say, the grievances that brought all these old men and women to the streets had little in common with the demands of the Georgian and Ukrainian opposition. Similarly, the Western media nicknamed the demonstrations and civic unrest that followed the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri “The Cedar Revolution.” One may argue with the appropriateness of these implied comparisons, but the situation in a number of former republics of the Soviet Union is genuinely perceived as “revolutionary.”

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frequently speculate on “who’s next.” A number of interactive maps of the former Soviet Union have appeared online assessing the plausibility of a revolution in each “unreformed” post-Soviet country based on factors ranging from EU and US position to the level of popular discontent there. Nobody knows for sure whether these projected revolutions will materialize at all, and if so, when. Yet the notion of a wave of revolutions has, mostly on account of its geopolitical implications, deeply penetrated the popular imagination.

The common explanation most Western observers see behind this phenomenon was expressed by George W. Bush during a visit to Bratislava: “[…] the democratic revolutions that swept this region over 15 years ago are now reaching Georgia and Ukraine.” In a recent op-ed in the Guardian, Timothy Garton Ash, the Oxford professor-turned-journalist and a celebrity thanks to his coverage of the 1989 revolutions, elaborated on the continuity between the two waves of revolutions in Eastern Europe. Without arguing the basic premises of this argument, this paper will be largely concerned with the difference between these two waves, and more specifically, with the new notion of civicness revolutionary Eastern European youth have demonstrated.

Indeed, young men and women not only played a part in the whole chain of revolutionary events, but sometimes theirs was the crucial and most distinctive part. Few believe that without the mobilizing potential of the 100,000 members of Otpor, Slobodan Milosevic’s government could have been toppled. With 9,700 arrests, they bore the brunt of the repressions. Kmara! in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine were smaller by comparison, with 3,000 and 9,000 registered members respectively, but evidently had a larger contingent of sympathizers. That youth should comprise by far the most militant and intransigent section of the demonstrators in Tbilisi and Kiev surprised no one;

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yet its forms of participation in civic took radically novel forms. In 1989, dissenting young men and women did not and would not formally organize as a separate group, preferring instead to march alongside like-minded adults. By contrast, Otpor, Kmara1 and Pora all registered as volunteer associations and kept themselves deliberately separate from the oppositional political parties. Their statements of principles do not advocate a political platform beyond the call for a fair electoral process and functional democracy.11 (Maybe an exception has to be made for their obvious Euro-Atlantic orientation. After all, young Eastern European elites represent the most Westernized section of the population.) Without a doubt, such a refusal to enter politics reflects the political plurality of their members, but it also indicates their determination to keep their protest above politics, or anti-political in the Havelian sense of the word.12 For the past fifteen or so years oppositional political parties, including those alongside which these youth groups were demonstrating, have rather discredited themselves through bickering and excessive personalism. It is no coincidence, therefore, that following the electoral victories of their political allies, the youth groups have vowed to remain “watchdogs of democracy” under the very governments they helped install into power.13 They do not belong to the world of politics; yet they resemble the very first loose civic associations to appear in Eastern Europe (ranging from Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia to Ecoglasnost in Bulgaria) even less because of the coherence of their organizations and the age of their memberships.

Such intense participation in politics by youth merits particular consideration. After all, post-1989 Eastern European youth have gained notoriety for their political apathy. The majority of them tend to view organized youth groups with special suspicion “after forced membership in the Young Pioneers, which most described as a big bluff that amounted to nothing more than the disciplinary rituals of ironing their ties and standing at attention in daily lineiki (line-ups).”14 Disenchantment with the practically authoritarian government as well as with the messy, extremely ineffectual democratic

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13 In fact, they have since frequently entered into conflict with the very same they parties and leaders they helped install into government. Georgia’s Kmara, for example, has criticize the new president, Mikhail Saakashvili, for concentrating too much of the state’s power in his office. Pora has entered into a major conflict with the Minister of Justice. Otpor ran a demonstrative campaign in last year’s Serbian parliamentary elections to highlight some of the issues the new government had not addressed.
process affected much of the population, especially given the heightened expectations of the 1989-1991 revolutions. When political rhetoric fails to translate into reality, its slogans and ideology-laden platforms lose both their meaning and appeal. Yet young men and women, probably the demographic category most sensitive culturally and politically, have been especially affected by the culture of disappointment in which they have been steeped since childhood. One needs not look far for a precedent to youth apathy in the 1990s. During the 1970s and 1980s, many young people in the Soviet bloc suffered similar disappointment with erstwhile ideals. Out of the authorities’ attempt to rationalize it grew the labels of *bezydeinost’* (lack of an ideological commitment) and *nigilistichnost’* (nihilism), frequently used to explain the general detachment of much of Soviet youth. The revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe as well as the wave of declarations of independences that swept through the Soviet Union in 1991 reinvigorated public discourse and brought many students to the frontlines of political demonstrations. Conveniently, the central university of each Eastern European country or Soviet republic was situated very close to the main squares and other primary sites of protests.

The recent revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine exercised a similar mobilizing effect on youth. While government and opposition parties have not altered their rhetoric significantly since the early 1990s, judging by the language and visual symbolism of the recent revolutions, groups such as *Otpor, Kmara!* and *Pora* have creatively transformed civic discourse and reformulated the practice of citizenship. This transformation has, in turn, won back many young men and women to the world of civic participation. Yet symbolism not only serves as a mobilizing device; it also presents the group and frames its issues to the wider public. As complex symbolic systems as those employed by *Otpor, Kmara!* and *Pora* cannot be reduced to a single explanation, but an analysis of them may reveal more about their intentions than their programmatic statements. Their chants, posters and performances certainly established a certain visual and aural continuity with the 1989 revolutions. The very names of these groups (“*kmara*” means “enough” in Georgian while “*pora*” means “it’s time” in Ukrainian) hearken back to the first slogans heard on the streets of Eastern Europe: “Now’s the time!” and “That’s it!” in Czechoslovakia, “Forty-five years are enough! Time is on our side!” in Bulgaria (Garton Ash 83).\(^{15}\) *Otpor’s* most prominent slogan “*Gotov je!*** (“He [Milosevic] is finished!”), too, refers to the same impatient desire to accelerate the transition that was so widespread in Eastern Europe a decade and a half ago. The distribution of roses, which gave the Georgian revolution its name, was no

Kmara! invention, of course, but a time-honored protest device in Central Europe. Flowers, as well as baby carriages, endowed both waves of revolutions with a particularly pacific image. After all, non-violence, according to Timothy Garton Ash is “the first commandment of Central European opposition.” In Ukraine, Pora activists handed out oranges instead of flowers. In Kyrgyzstan, lemons became the material symbol of the revolution, and were distributed in vast quantities by KelKel members. Each youth group adapted the general system of protest symbolism in 1989 to its own particular conditions.

Yet the color scheme of the recent revolutions did not evoke the blue that dominated the 1989 demonstrations. Both Pora and KelKel adopted yellow, a color with no political association. In doing so, they once again demonstrated their independence from the discredited sphere of party politics. As a bonus, they gained very bright, spectacular colors. Yellow became the color of Pora’s T-shirts, which most members wore during demonstrations (see pictures in Appendix). Such uniformity in fashion, even had it been technically possible to achieve, would have been an anathema fifteen years ago when student protesters considered the high school uniform many of them had to wear as symbolic of the authoritarian political system. Individuality of style carried an ideological component now absent among contemporary Ukrainian youth. Their yellow shirts multiplied the effect of their presence, making it visually commanding. The rest of the population, too, wore attributes such as scarves of the appropriate color, badges and so on. These revolutions, besides everything else, were a visual spectacle.

The yellow color provided another reference: the national flags of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. After all, the recent wave of revolutions, as those in 1989, has been tinged by a certain nationalist spirit. National flags represented an inevitable fixture of protests in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, both in the recent revolutionary wave and before. Anthems were sung in both cases. Yet these movements also possessed an internationalist revolutionary

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17 Garton Ash, 128.
18 The events in Ukraine will remain in history as called “Orange Revolution” because orange was the color of the “Our Ukraine” coalition headed by the now-President Viktor Yushchenko. That color was only subsequently adopted by Pora, who still maintained their official preference for yellow.
19 Interestingly, the opposition coalition in Georgia insisted on using a hitherto obscure Georgian medieval flag (a red cross on a white background with a small red cross in each of the four quadrants formed by the main cross) instead of the then-official one.
imagery. Jared Israel traces the origins of Otpor’s famous fist, their signature image, to student protests in Harvard. Serbian TV viewers watching news about the events in Tbilisi in December 2003 were highly amused to see this same fist accompanied by a caption in Serbian "Gotov je!" ("He’s finished") on the posters of Georgian demonstrators. Regardless of whether the absence of a translation was inadvertent or deliberate, this sign established perfect continuity between the two revolutions. This image as well as numerous Georgian flags appeared prominently in Kiev’s main Independence Square in November and December 2004. Through frequent references to successful regional revolutions the demonstrators sought to suggest a scenario for what was to happen in their own country. Judging by the appearance of that same fist in New York during the recent Columbia graduate student strike, the 2000 Belgrade revolution has returned the now-forgotten symbol to the USA. (How strange the ways of Revolution!) These opposite tendencies, national and international, achieved their true syntheses in Pora’s somewhat controversial image of Che Guevarra on a yellow background, wearing a traditional Ukrainian shirt or in Pora’s anthem (“Together we are many!” — “Razom nas bogato”), a hip-hop song on Ukrainian themes or the Ukrainian rock concerts on Kiev’s Independence Square every single day of the stand-off. The symbolic combinations present in all these youth movements express fully the dual pro-Western (Che excepted), yet nationalist (as opposed to pro-Russian) orientation of the protesters themselves.

These youth groups aim their message at international as well as domestic audiences. It is no coincidence that the articles in Western newspapers dealing with the events in Belgrade, Tbilisi and Kiev focused on Otpor, Kmara! and Pora almost to the exclusion of other political forces. The youth groups owe this success in attracting Western attention partly to Western media’s own method of constructing the image of Eastern European opposition. The young, liberal demonstrators conform to the Western viewer’s expectation of an anti-authoritarian movement much better than the bearded nationalists or discredited and frequently corrupt oppositional politicians. Indeed, a major way in which youth activists gained influence in this

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20 Please, refer to the Appendix for the symbols discussed in this paper, but a more comprehensive collection of images, please, go to each youth groups’ websites: http://www.otpor.com (Otpor), http://www.kmara.ge (Kmara!), the web page would not open at the time of writing), http://www.pora.org.ua (Pora), http://www.kelkel-kg.org (KelKel).


confrontation was by serving as alternative sources of information. Their presentation of the facts was especially effective in the eyes of international media: “Activists interpret facts and testimony, usually framing issues simply, in terms of right and wrong, because their purpose is to persuade people and stimulate them to act.” Indeed, Otpor, Kmara! and Pora media teams employed testimonies very eloquently, identified those narratives of greatest use to journalists, and found the most appropriate names for each event. The youth supporting Viktor Yanukovich, by contrast, functioned in the eyes of Western media as Pora’s evil twin: unkempt boys bussed from the Eastern provinces unable to talk in front of cameras. When words ran out, they would resort to stronger, more physical arguments.

Most Otpor, Kmara! and Pora members are students at the University of Belgrade, Tbilisi or Kiev (the countries’ central institutions of secondary education) or the most prestigious high schools in the capital. They represent the young elites of their countries. Most of them speak English, which has achieved the status of lingua franca of these revolutions. A visit to the web sites of these movements would reveal the extent to which their informational materials have been translated into English (see footnote 19). The Belgrade-based Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), one of the forms in which post-2000 Otpor continues to exist, even lacks a Serbian page. The detailed English version of Pora’s statement of purpose on their web site explicitly mentions the group’s Euro-Atlantic orientation while the much shorter Ukrainian statement does not. The web sites themselves manifest a good deal of technological sophistication, and include archives with newsletters, forums, photo galleries, links to similar organizations, and in

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25 In a recent paper delivered at the Yale Slavic Graduate Students’ Conference, April 7-9, Dan Feldman questioned Eastern and Central European’s intelligentsia’s traditional claim to speak for “the whole nation.” The intellectual class of these countries has its own class interests, which do not always coincide with the interests of other classes. Most of the Soviet-era nostalgia, for example, is focused on the late 1970s, that is, the height of the so-called Stagnation, when the culturally and socially conservative policies of the Brezhnev era had undermined the freedoms and hopes enjoyed by the intellectual class during the Thaw. However, for the majority of former Soviet population, the period was characterized by stability, security and slow, but steady improvement of living standards. (Economically, of course, this final phase of the Stagnation was unsustainable. The need for economic reforms was probably the chief impetus for glasnost’ and perestroika that followed.)

26 Please, compare the English statement of purpose http://pora.org.ua/en/content/view/723/95/ with the Ukrainian: http://pora.org.ua/content/view/2502/151/.
Pora’s case, an opportunity to donate. Internet, however, does not exhaust their technological sophistication. During the events of November and December 2004, their very professional posters can be downloaded online, facilitating their dissemination. Pora’s use of cell phones enabled them to co-ordinate demonstrations almost instantaneously.

Similar deployment of revolutionary technology and symbolism mirrors their deeper structural commonalities. Besides links to each other, their web sites contain a common set of texts on topics ranging from toppling dictatorships to surviving in prison or behaving properly when arrested. The text the reader will most likely find in all web sites of youth organizations is Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democracy: a Conceptual Framework for Liberation, first published in Bangkok in 1993 by the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma. Since its appearance in four Burmese languages, it has been translated into Serbian, Ukrainian, Azeri, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, Spanish and a number of other languages.27 Gene Sharp is the senior fellow of the Boston-based Albert Einstein Institution, “a nonprofit organization advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world.”28 True to its subtitle, this simply written book offers a broad overview of the process of confronting an authoritarian government. Most of it is devoted to the organizing and strategic planning of an opposition movement. It ends with an appendix of 198 methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, many of them clearly drawn from US civil rights experience. The dissident movement before 1989, too, produced its own guidebooks, most famously the 1983 Polish “Little Conspirator” (to be found on the KelKel web site in a Russian translation), which outlined a code of behavior for Eastern European citizens living in a repressive state. While one could learn how to organize a dissident cell, how to communicate subversive information, or what to do when arrested from the “Conspirator,” this samizdat brochure (22 pages) naturally lacks the systematic coverage and professionalism that distinguish Gene Sharp’s work. His think-tank is hardly

27 Sharp, Gene. From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2002. Instead of the ordinary copyright notice, the cover of the book announces that “all material appearing in this publication is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission from Gene Sharp” (iv). (Don’t you wish everyone was that generous with their intellectual labor?) Indeed, even on the web page of this books publisher, on can find a free downloadable .pdf version of the book in all its translations. The last page of each usually contains an invitation for the readers to undertake a translation of this book in their own languages (87).

the only one to offer the present Eastern European revolutionaries advice on non-violent action. His colleagues from the Washington-based International Center for Non-Violent Conflict publish an impressive array of literature on non-violent regime change. As can be witnessed from their web sites, Eastern European youth groups have proven a particularly receptive audience for such advice.

Naturally, foreign help often transcends the merely conceptual and finds more tangible expressions. In a sense, the most classic anti-revolutionary accusation, namely, that the events in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine represent Western interference into the domestic politics of sovereign Eastern European countries does not ring entirely untrue, even if it completely ignores the domestic and regional aspect of these revolutions. Otpor members never denied the fact that their foreign funding helped them build up an organization. After the successful conclusion of the events in Serbia, Otpor activists founded CANVAS (Center for Applied Non-Violent Strategy) and the Centre for Non-Violent Resistance to export their non-violent revolution. In an instance of regional co-operation made possible through international funding, they helped train the fourteen Knaral activists, who came to Belgrade on a trip subsidized by George Soros’s Open Society Institute. Subsequently, various NGOs brought Georgian and Serb activists with experience of regime change to Ukraine, financed the campaign to plaster most of the country with anti-Kuchma posters, and defrayed the costs of the tents and plasma screens erected in Kiev’s Independence Square. After that election and with NGO assistance, Ukrainian Pora activists in turn established a Nova Pora election monitoring center in Azerbaijan, and are currently giving training and advice to a number of youth groups from different CIS countries.

Relationships between local NGOs and youth movements are not limited to funding, however. Members of the leadership teams of Otpor, Knaral and Pora hail from the ranks of NGOs workers, that young professional Anglophone community residing in the capitals. The Western-imported technology, ideas and colleague as well as the very rhythm of work have reinforced their position at the interface between the local and the international,
Western culture.33 The NGO-speak they have mastered and their
distinguishable life-style often bring anthropologists to refer to them as “Euro-
elites.”34 These Euro-elites produced by NGO culture the have brought to the
youth groups their Western sociopolitical orientation and mode of work.

NGOs affected all aspects of the 2004 Ukraine election, not just the youth
groups’ role. USAID (US Agency for International Development), NED
(National Endowment for Democracy), NDI (National Democratic Institute),
IRI (International Republican Institute), Freedom House and other, mostly
American, foundations provided the critical help to Viktor Yushchenko’s
opposition. They brought an unprecedented number of election monitors, and
subsized opinion polls, and parallel vote tabulations that substantiated the
falsification charges. The “third sector” challenged the government on many a
front, but none as crucial as the spreading of information, both within the
country and without. As the opposition parties engaged the governing party,
the international network of NGOs entered a real contest with the
government’s resources, especially the media, on which the government holds
the monopoly. Yet it is not the purpose of this essay to blindly judge Western
support (certainly more than matched by the government’s control over the
media and the law enforcement agencies as well as by Russia’s explicit
endorsement of Viktor Yanukovich), but rather to study the degree of its
influence over local NGOs and youth groups.

In a process well-described by Ann Hudock, NGO funding trickles down
from foundations or governments in the donor countries to international
NGOs, finally making its way to local NGOs.35 The degree to which ideology
filters down together with funds is usually inversely related to the local group’s
significance and embededness in a given country: “While a ‘third sector’ now
exists in these societies, in many cases it cannot truly be described as “civil”
and “civic” minded. NGOs are frequently weak factors in their local culture;
they focus more on issues of importance to people outside the community.”36
Attempting to determine the degree to which initiative in the organization of

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35 The complexity of the process, whereby donors in developed countries through the terms of
their grants specify the type of work conducted by international and local NGOs in developing
ones, has been described best in Hudock, Ann. NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy.
each youth group belongs to young local activists or Open Society representatives would constitute a highly subjective and ungrateful task. As a general rule, the more liberal the political regime, the more developed the local NGO sector, the greater the significance of local initiative. In the opinion of the author of this paper, Pora, Kmara!, and especially Otpor, did enjoy significant local support base because of the relatively liberal domestic policies of Ukraine’s, Georgia’s and Serbia’s governments. However, it is hard to imagine genuine and popular oppositional youth movements arising out of the very thin and persecuted non-profit community in Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, let alone Turkmenistan.

Youth groups proliferate in those countries where the NGO sector has been allowed to operate. Russia boasts several such youth movements: Golos (Voice), Oborona (Defence), Idushchie bez Putina (Walking without Putin), as well as the Russian Pora. And it is hardly the only fertile ground for such mushrooming organizations. Foreboding more revolutions in the future, similar groups have appeared in Albania (Mjaft!, Enough!), Belarus (Zubr, Bison), Azerbaijan (Yokh!, No), Kazakhstan (Kahar). This list is far from exhaustive, and as Russia’s example illustrates, more than one youth group can develop in each country. The Belorussian Zubr has staged major demonstrations and sustained a significant numbers of arrests, but the genuineness of the other movements is very hard to ascertain, especially in the absence of revolutions.

Whenever these groups fail to attract a significant following, the role of technology, good foreign connections and media campaigning behind these movements becomes more obvious. In fact, the smaller and less successful they are, the more apparent their conception as “projects.” The Eastern European usage of this term might require additional explication, for over the last ten years it has acquired a somewhat different meaning there than it enjoys in the West. Steven Sampson, a scholar of post-Soviet NGOs, defines “project” as “a special kind of activity with a specific goal and output, a schedule, and a budget controlled by donors, their contractors, and a target group, and taking into account various stake-holders involved.” Even though this definition does not encompass the full extent of project activity, and unjustifiably confines

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the phenomenon to the NGO world, it adds the necessary specificity the English word lacks. Projects typically start within an organization, such as an NGO, without a constituency, but seek to acquire one through a set of public actions, and a multi-level mobilizing campaign. In their privileging of strategy and fast flow of information over collective decisions and organic growth, Otpor, Knara! and Pora share typical project characteristics. According to Steve Sampson, project life is a “world with a premium on abstract knowledge, by which power accrues to those best able to manipulate the key symbols and concepts.” NGO networks facilitate the extremely rapid circulation of these symbols and concepts among like-minded groups, rendering the various oppositional movements in different Eastern European countries rather more organizationally similar than their predecessors in 1989. The “cloning” of projects, too, reinforces their status as a form of engineering, albeit social rather than biotechnological.

Post-Soviet governments have naturally tried to curtail this kind of social engineering over which they have no control. In some cases, they have responded with their own set of projects. Just before the elections that proved to be his undoing, for example, former President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan called “the spread of “velvet revolution” technology [...] a challenge to all new post-Soviet states.” Yet two months prior to the election his government or its sympathizers responded to the danger through the creation of their own counter-revolutionary technology: another group that called itself KelKel. Its leader had the same surname as the leader of the original KelKel (Aitbaeva), and its web site (http://www.kelkel.kg) displays identical structure and symbolism to the web site of the oppositional KelKel (http://www.kelkel-kg.org). The statement of purpose of the KelKel “clone” warns against the ‘hijacking of youth for the purposes of importing revolution’ or for personal gain.” Instead, it proposes to turn Kyrgyzstan into “a country of dreams” by first “establishing stability.” The rest of their program seems borrowed from the Young Pioneer movement, only without the Marxist-Leninist ideology. More seriously, a youth group called Nashi (Ours) is being created and widely advertised on Russian TV with the explicit purpose of serving as a foil to the several pro-revolutionary youth groups as well as the one genuine and

40 Ibid., 306.
43 Ibid.
powerful Russian political youth movement: the radical National Bolshevik Party led by the very mad writer Edward Limonov. Nashi will replace the now defunct pro-government Idushchie vmeste (Walking Together), a youth movement that gained (and destroyed) its reputation by publicly burning multiple copies of Vladimir Sorokin’s pornographic novel Goluboe Salo. The major difference between the two lies in Nashi’s supposedly greater anger and aggression. Both groups have been allocated a very generous budget and run by the same person, Vasilii Yakimenko, a member of staff in the Kremlin administration. His claims that “Nashi is not his project but a spontaneous union of young patriots” sound the contrary to the group’s reality.

But these instances of “cloning” hardly exhaust the state’s use of project technology. During the Ukrainian elections, the presence of Gleb Pavlovsky, the President of the Kremlin-related Fund for Effective Policy and Russia’s chief political technologist, caused much stir among the opposition. Although his exact role in the disputed campaign was never clear, he had explicitly come to consult the media and strategy team of the then Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. Pavlovsky lost, but his presence only added to the sense that, besides a choice between two different platforms, that election represented a battle of political technologies: on one side, those of the Ukrainian and Russian governments, on the other—Western-sponsored NGOs’. In that technological confrontation, the governments were often learning from the NGOs.

As in any revolution, however, the struggle between post-Soviet governments and NGO networks is an essentially asymmetrical one. The governments continue to deploy their arsenal of more traditional methods against the NGOs: many have increased audits and other investigations of the non-governmental sector, and introduced legislative changes that restrict its activities. George Soros’s Open Society Institute, which very evidently and proudly participated in the Rose Revolution, has been all but expelled from Russia and many other “controlled democracies.” Under these new conditions, many other NGOs have reduced their presence in the region, not only making, in the words of one observer, further revolutions “harder to achieve,” but also affecting NGO activities in practically all fields, down to the most apolitical,

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45 Ibid.
46 A third sphere in which projects are widely deployed, besides NGO and government, is culture. Many cultural initiatives in Eastern Europe are called and run as projects.
Ordinary men and women’s rudimentary notion of what it meant to build a civil society might not satisfy the political theorist. But some such notion was there, and it contained several basic demands. There should be forms of association, national, regional, local, professional, which would be voluntary, authentic, democratic and first and last, not controlled by the Party or Party-state. People should be “civil”: that is, polite, tolerant, and, above all, non-violent. Civil and civilian. The idea of citizenship had to be taken seriously. [...] People had enough of being mere components in a deliberately atomized society: they wanted to be citizens, individual men and women with dignity and responsibility, freely associating in civil society.\footnote{51}

In essence, what Timothy Garton Ash describes is a feeling, a mood, a common desire to participate in the decisions your country has to make, that can and usually does take the form of groups of like-minded people. He goes on to name the first such voluntary associations in Eastern Europe, the precursors of


\footnote{48}By contrast, the governments brought to power through such revolutions have largely sought to empower the role of NGOs in their countries.

\footnote{49}Keck and Sikkink, 1-2.

\footnote{50}Garton Ash, 147.

\footnote{51}Ibid., 147-48.
today’s political parties: Citizen’s Parliamentary Club, Solidarity’s parliamentary group; Civic Forum, the major oppositional coalition in Czechoslovakia; Bürgeninitiativen (civic initiatives), the amorphous opposition groups that first appeared in GDR. One cannot fail to notice the palpable difference between these and the advocacy networks of which Otpor, Kmara! and Pora are a part. The loose civic associations of other-thinking (inakomysliashchie) individuals in the late 1980s became the professional non-governmental organizations of 2000s determined to bring down governments. (Naturally, another very significant component of those early civic formations evolved off into a different type of organization: political parties.) By comparison to the young Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Germans, the members of Otpor, Kmara! and Pora had a much clearer vision of what they wanted and how they could achieve it. After all, the battle lines between government and opposition in 1989 were much less sharply drawn, allowing for a much more amorphous civil society. If we trust the British historian’s narrative of the revolution of 1989, it seems that the former dissidents were being “sucked into power faster than [they] wanted to.”52 Not to discount their marvelous effort, but the chief role of the organized Central European opposition lay in negotiating the terms of the transition, not in executing a revolution. That was emphatically not the case in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, where to remove the entrenched regimes the civil society needed to mobilize all possible resources and coalesce into an effective organizational network.

Whenever these groups fail to attract a significant following, the role of technology, good foreign connections and media campaigning behind these youth movements becomes more obvious. In fact, the smaller and less successful they are, the more apparent their conception as “projects.” The specifics of the Eastern European usage of the term might require additional explication, for over the last ten years it has acquired a somewhat different meaning than what it has in the West. Steven Sampson defines the Eastern European “project” as “a special kind of activity with a specific goal and output, a schedule, and a budget controlled by donors, their contractors, and a target group, and taking into account various stake-holders involved.” Eastern European projects can be political, but they could also be literary (Project Pelevin), cultural (Moscow’s premier literary café, Project OGl), cinematic (the recent movie Night Guard) and national(ist) (of these there are plenty). There is even a Presidential Council for the Realization of National Projects (http://www.rrost.ru). A project typically starts within an organization, such as an NGO or a publishing house, without a constituency, but seek to acquire one through a set of public actions, and a multi-

52 Ibid., 37.
level mobilizing campaign. It represents a positive reading of post-structuralist theory’s chief premise. Everything is constructed. We acknowledge that fact and go on constructing. Such deliberate, accelerated construction replaces reality with a reality-in-the-making, and breeds suspicion of the former. After all, we can never be sure whether a phenomenon we encounter is “real,” or at least, permanent, or whether we are dealing with a concerted application of political, media and other technology aimed at convincing us of the reality of a project that eventually may or may not prove successful. Projects make all the more acute the unfortunate Darwinian logic to which most social movements and initiatives are subject (if successful, they must have been the right, moral thing to do, a Revolution; if failures, they must have been wrong, or at least, a waste of time, or worse, treason).

This phenomenon’s ubiquity in many countries of the former Soviet bloc could be attributed to the present instability of the cultural and political institutions in the Second World and the opportunities it affords for cultural construction. In the process of this construction, the author vanishes. After all, within the framework of the project, the author cedes primacy to publisher, the film director—to the producer, the painter—to the gallery curator, the ideologue—to the kulturtreger, the politician—to the political technologist. The death of the author occurring within the project suggests one of the many ways in which this phenomenon represents an alternative, post-Second World post-modernity. Yet to return to our protagonists, in privileging of strategy and schedule over collective decisions and organic growth, Otpor, Kmara! and Pora share typical project characteristics. Paradoxically, because of the success of these projects, however, they are no longer perceived as projects but rather, as credible social movements.

It was the argument of this paper that the advent of the project as the prevalent form of engagement in the body politic tolled the death knell to the Eastern European civil society of 1989, and inaugurated a new kind: as the erstwhile amateurs gave way to today’s professionals; the amorphous, undifferentiated collective became a structured, coherent organization; the primitive graffiti were replaced by computer-designed posters; rumor—by internet forums; relative lack of self-awareness—by calculated projections to domestic as well as international audiences; unconnectedness with the outside world—by intricate embeddedness into the network and channels of NGOs; amorphous gatherings in the hundreds of thousands—by a much smaller, but

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53 “Second-World modernity,” the Soviet system’s attempt to create an alternative modernity, is an established concept in East European cultural studies thanks to Nancy Condee’s popularizing work.
highly effective units; orientation towards identity expression—by an orientation towards concrete goals; utopian hopes—by lots of strategizing.

The transformation of civil society raises a veritable host of questions. The issue of foreign participation has already made an appearance in this paper. This new global civil society allows foreign foundations, often sponsored by foreign governments, to affect electoral and policy outcomes without any accountability to the local population. As a result, it frequently represents mainly that constituency whose goals and values resonate best with the goals and values of the international donors. It has proven incapable, for example, of lending its voice to the concerns of Eastern Ukrainians, for the ideological confrontation has assigned these to a different camp.

This new civil society already has a record of three or four successful revolutions. Few would question the disastrousness of Slobodan Milosevic’s government for Serbia or deny Otpor credit for helping topple it. By November 2003, Edward Schevarnadze’s government had grown unpopular, and few defended it against the demonstrations and challenges of the opposition, but the Rose Revolution did raise more international eyebrows owing to the nationalist rhetoric and own authoritarian tendencies within the opposition. The regime change in Ukraine, however, produced the real controversy as a significant section of the population (44%, judging by the third round of the presidential election) refused to support the opposition and remained loyal to the incumbent even after the political time had turned against him. The tragic events in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan a year ago show the limits to this revolutionary wave. What if this globalized civil society deposes a government such as Hugo Chavez’s in Venezuela?54 For, judging by CANVAS’s web site, Venezuela is its next target country. The involvement of the same people, the use of the same methods and the single narrative of these revolutions may transfer the undoubted moral legitimacy of Otpor’s fight against Milosevic to rather more questionable causes. If it is to avoid become a regime-changing technology, a series of “projects,” this new civil society must recognize its limitations, and not extend its activity beyond its popular support. The modernization of civil society since 1989 has structured and channeled civic participation, consigning activism to the professional sphere of NGOs. Such

professionalization (bolshevization) of activism can occur at the detriment of civicness.

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Otpor’s fist (1) and Pora’s ticking clock (2)


KelKel’s Lemon (3) and Zubr’s (Belorussia) Bison (4)

Pora activists

http://pora.org.ua/component/option,com_zoom/Itemid,162/page/view/catid,52/PageNo,1/key,1/hit,1/.

Pora’s Che (4). Georgian opposition celebrating (5).

http://pora.org.ua/content/blogcategory/123/166/